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This	essay	deals	with	 the	 ‘problem’	of	 the	wearing	of	headscarves	by	
Muslim	 schoolgirls	 in	 the	public	 space	 of	modern	France.	 In	March	
2004,	France’s	national	 legislature	passed	a	 law	prohibiting	pupils	 in	
public	 schools	 from	wearing	 symbols	 or	 attire	which	 conspicuously	
express	religious	affiliation.	 In	 this	essay,	 the	author	regards	the	three	
pivotal	factors	in	the	creation	of	this	‘problem’	as	secularism,	gender	and	




I. Laïcité as the Bedrock of Republican Democracy
	 The	 term	 laïcité	 first	 appeared	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	
(Buisson,	 2000).	 It	 is	 formed	 from	 the	French	adjective	 laïque,	 itself	
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deriving	 from	 the	Greek	 laos	meaning	 ‘the	 people’.	According	 to	
Littré’s	dictionary,	 the	adjective	 laïc	describes	 “one	who	 is	neither	a	
clergyman	nor	a	religious	person”.		In	the	latter	half	of	the	19th	century	
the	masculine	and	 feminine	 forms	of	 this	 adjective	 took	on	different	
meanings.	The	masculine	 form	laïc	came	to	describe	one	who	 is	not	a	
cleric	 (clerc),	 a	category	 including	acolytes	not	yet	ordained,	whereas	
the	 feminine	 form	 laïque	 came	 to	describe	 things	 “falling	under	 the	
category	 laïcité”	 	 (Conseil	d’État,	 2004).	Thus,	 in	 laïc	 an	opposition	 is	
set	up	between	the	clergy	and	the	 laity,	whereas	 in	the	 feminine	 form	
laïque,	 the	concept	of	an	 institutional	reality	separate	 from	the	Catholic	
Church	 inheres	 in	 the	 very	 definition	 of	 the	word—and	 of	 course	
the	new	reality	 expressed	here	by	 the	word	 laïcité	 is	precisely	 the	





philosophy	realized	even	 if	 large	areas	were	excluded	 (Conseil	d’État,	






to	 lead	people	away	from	the	 ignorance	that	resulted	 in	the	tyrannical	








Of	 course	 as	 is	well	 known,	 under	 the	 banner	 of	 these	 ideals,	 the	
Revolution	at	 its	height	paradoxically	gave	birth	to	a	number	of	 forms	
of	 religious	expression.	For	example,	 in	company	with	 the	Goddess	of	
Liberty,	the	Cult	of	Reason	was	celebrated	by	some	revolutionary	groups.	
Even	Robespierre,	who	criticized	the	atheistic	element	of	such	worship,	
proclaimed	the	existence	of	 the	 ‘Supreme	Being’,	while	 in	 the	Reign	of	
Terror	instigated	by	Robespierre,	the	traditional	religions	of	Catholicism,	
Protestantism	and	Judaism	saw	a	great	number	of	their	clergy	executed.
	 It	was	 in	 these	chaotic	 times	 that	Napoleon	Bonaparte	came	
to	power,	 and	agreed	a	concordat	with	Pope	Pius	VII.	This	 contract	
between	Church	and	State	did	not,	 however,	 restore	Catholicism	 to	
















‘first	epoch’	of	 laicization.	 	 It	 is	worth	noting	that	Napoleon	maintained	
the	secular	nature	of	 the	 family	 law	 through	his	promulgation	of	 the	
civil	 code,	and	also	paved	 the	way	 for	hospitals	and	schools,	 two	key	
institutions,	 to	 achieve	 a	degree	 of	 independence	 from	 the	Catholic	
Church	(Baubérot,	2000).	
	 The	 concordat	 system	remained	 in	place	until	 1905,	 though	
not	without	challenge.	The	Restoration	 (1814-30)	attempted	to	reinvest	
Catholicism	with	 the	 character	 of	 state	 religion	 (without,	 however,	
abandoning	 the	 traditional	 idea	 of	 Gallicanism)ii.	 In	 contrast,	 by	
proclaiming	 in	 the	Charter	of	1830	 that	Catholicism	was	 "the	religion	
professed	by	the	majority	of	 the	French,"	 the	July	Monarchy	reversed	
the	Restoration's	 supportive	 stance	 towards	 ecclesiastical	 authority.	
According	 to	 the	historian	Minoru	Tanigawa,	 the	Catholic	Church,	





Republic	 and	 the	Second	Empire	under	Napolean	 III	 (at	 least	before	












at	putting	an	end	 to	 the	Catholic	Church’s	 involvement	 in	public	 life,	
but	 also	 at	weakening	 its	 influence	 throughout	 the	whole	 of	 society.	
The	main	anticlerical	policies	 of	 this	period	 included	abolition	of	 the	
obligation	to	refrain	 from	working	on	the	Sabbath	 (1880),	 secularization	
of	hospitals	and	cemeteries,	restoration	of	divorce	(1884),	the	requirement	
for	monastic	orders	 to	obtain	governmental	authorization	 (or	be	closed	
down	 if	 they	 failed	 to	comply)	 (1880).	 In	 this	atmosphere	of	 tension	a	
series	 of	 education	 laws	were	also	 adopted.	Laws	 relating	 to	 female	




established	 that	public	primary	education	should	be	 “mandatory,	 free	
of	charge	and	 laic”.	The	1882	Ferry	Law	stipulated	that	“if	 the	parents	
so	wish,	 a	 child	may	 receive	 religious	 education	 outside	 of	 school”;	
however,	 this	 effectively	banished	 religious	 instruction	 from	public	
primary	education.	Then	in	1886,	the	Goblet	law	laicized	school	personell	
and	 prohibited	 regional	 authorities	 from	 financing	 private	 schools,	
ensuring	that	 they	would	 fulfil	 their	obligation	to	maintain	at	 least	one	
public	school.	This	represented	a	considerable	withdrawal	of	the	control	
exercised	by	the	Church	on	public	primary	education	under	the	Guizot	
law	 (1833)	and	Falloux	 law	 (1850).	 It	 should,	however,	be	remembered	
that	 this	 laicization	of	schools	 took	place	within	the	existing	system	of	
officially	recognized	religions	(Baubérot,	2000).	





This	 law	aimed	to	reconcile	 the	 ‘two	France’	by	guaranteeing	 freedom	
of	 religious	worship	and	giving	consideration	 to	 the	practical	 realities	


















	 (1) The concept of laïcité has gained broad consensus in 
contemporary French societyiii.	 If	 laïcité	 has	gained	 consensus,	 it	 is	
because	it	has	developed	through	the	history	of	French	republicanism	to	
become	established	in	a	single	legal	framework.	This	does	not	necessarily	
mean	that	the	term	 ‘laïcité’	has	escaped	ambiguity	 in	 its	usage.	On	the	
contrary,	 it	 could	even	be	 said	 that	 this	 consensus	originates	 in	 the	






briefly	consider	what	those	two	sides	are.	On one side, laïcité bears the 
face of Gallicanism—the	principle	of	independence	of	the	French	Church.	
When	comparing	French	laïcité	with	systems	of	church-state	separation	







of	diplomacy)iv.	 In	 its	other	aspect,	 it	could	also	be	said	that	 for a long 
time, the establishment of laïcité was synonymous with the advance of 




The	1905	 law,	 in	providing	a	 framework	for	religious	pluralism	without	
institutionalizing	 the	officially	recognized	religions,	made	a	break	with	
the	principle	of	 royal	power	as	part	of	France’s	political	 tradition.	Of	
course	when	one	hears	 the	words	of	people	almost	 fundamentalist	 in	
their	support	of	modern	 laïcité	 it	 is	hard	to	escape	the	 impression	that	
some	ambivalence	towards	this	break	with	the	past	still	remains.v
	 (2) The presence of the Islamic headscarf in the public space of 
modern France presents a challenge to the broad ‘republican’ consensus 




that created this consensus, has remained ‘still unconsidered’.	As	
the	 foregoing	examination	of	 the	 subject	 shows,	 the	notion	of	 laïcité	
has	been	a	key	element	 in	 the	democratic	 legitimacy	of	 the	French	
Republic.	However,	because	of	this	foundational	role,	it	is	essential	not	to	
lose	sight	of	 the	 formal	nature	of	 the	principle	of	separation	of	Church	
and	State.	That	 is	 to	 say,	 this	principle	has	 legitimacy	because	 it	has	
been	 formally	established.	The	public	 space	where	citizens	encounter	
one	another	 is	 constituted	on	 the	precondition	 that	 each	 individual’s	
religious	beliefs	remain	private	 (this	should	also	be	the	precondition	 for	
universal	realization	of	laïcité	as	a	legal	principle	at	least	in	the	national	
space	 (cf.	Althusser,	 2005)).	However	 in	 the	 reality	of	history,	 such	a	
republican	 ideal	has	only	ever	been	realized	 in	 forms	which	also	entail	
large	areas	of	exclusion.	 In	 its	report	 “Islam	 in	the	Republic”,	 the	High	
Council	on	Integration,	set	up	by	the	French	government	in	2002,	notes	
three	main	areas	where	 laïcité	 is	enforced	 inconsistently	 (Haut	Conseil	
à	 l’Intégration,	 2000).	These	 are	 (a)	 ownership	 and	administration	 of	
property	(religious	facilities)vi,	(b)	exclusion	of	a	number	of	French	regions	
from	 laïcité’s	 scope	of	applicationvii,	 and	 (c)	 the	 fact	 that	 the	1905	 law	
was	not	 implemented	 in	 former	départments	 in	Algeria.	 In	considering	
these	areas	of	exclusion,	we	 intend	 to	 focus	here	on	 the	dimension	of	
post-colonialism,	which	 is	 illuminated	 in	particular	by	 these	 last	 two	
areas.	For	it	is	precisely	this	dimension	which	can	indicate	those	things	
«as	yet	unthought»	 in	 the	historical	process	of	 laicization.	Our	 task	 is	
thus	to	analyze	the	“dissonance	 in	 laïcité”	 (Balibar,	2004)	struck	by	the	





II. Questions surrounding the connections between gender and 
postcolonial aspects of the headscarf problem.
In	 this	section	we	 focus	on	two	series	of	questions.	Firstly,	what	does	
the	 ‘headscarf’	 signify?	 In	particular	we	examine	 the	opinions	on	 the	
headscarf	problem	held	by	 feminists	 in	mutually	opposing	camps.	On	
one	side	are	 feminists	such	as	Elisabeth	Badinter	who	see	 the	root	of	
this	problem	as	 lying	with	 the	hijab	 as	 a	means	 of	propagating	 the	
marginalization	of	women,	and	who	criticize	 the	 liberals’	 call	 for	 ‘open	
laïcité’	and	tolerance	towards	the	wearing	of	the	hijab	in	public	schools—
what	they	see	as	the	 ‘Munich	of	Republican	schools’,	a	reference	to	the	
Munich	agreement	and	 the	 ill-advised	appeasing	stance	of	 the	 liberal	
camp	towards	the	spread	of	 fascism	(Badinter,	1986).	On	the	other	side	
are	the	feminists	who	differ	from	the	other	camp	in	acknowledging	the	


















determined	by	 the	history	 of	 class	 and	postcolonial	 immigration	 in	
France.	The	 law	passed	 on	March	 15,	 2004	 reflected	 the	 dilemma	
directly	 facing	the	Republican	school	against	this	historical	background.	
The	dilemma	 is	 that	while	 the	school	built	on	republican	principles	 is	
charged	with	the	mission	of	bringing	equality	to	all	members	of	society	






standards	 in	place	of	 the	previous	policy	of	 leaving	 the	discipline	of	
pupils	to	the	discretion	of	each	school,	and	this	indicates	that	even	in	the	
schools	themselves	there	was	an	awareness	of	the	dilemmaviii.		
a. The meaning of the ‘headscarf’: questions of gender
	 From	the	moment	 the	pupil	exits	 the	public	school	gates,	 the	
wearing	of	 religious	symbols	ceases	 to	be	a	violation	of	 the	 law—in	a	
nation	based	on	laïcité	this	legal	reality	does	nothing	to	explain	why	the	
debate	 in	France	 tends	 to	 include	 the	wearing	of	headscarves	outside	
school.	 In	attempting	 to	understand	this	 tendency,	 it	 is	appropriate	 to	
study	 the	problem	 from	 the	perspective	of	gender	 (Rochefort,	 2005),	
and	 in	this	regard	the	 feminist	arguments	are	of	great	 interest,	 for	the	
feminist	debate	 forces	us	 to	consider	 the	social	 function	of	clothing,	of	
the	headscarf	 itself.	 In	 fact	one	of	 the	points	which	divides	 feminists	





two	sets	of	historical	circumstances.	On	the	one	hand,	if modern feminism 
was established by liberating women from the Judao-Christian yoke, 
this inevitably gives the headscarf a prepackaged negative meaning	
ix.	As	Françoise	Gaspard	and	Farhad	Khosrokhavar	point	out,	 “even	 in	
France,	until	 only	 recently	 the	Catholic	Church	compelled	women	 to	
cover	their	hair	and	legs	when	going	out	into	the	town,	under	the	gaze	
of	men	outside	 the	 family,	while	 even	now	 the	wife	 of	 an	Orthodox	
Jew	must	shave	her	head	and	wear	a	wig”	 (Gaspard	&	Khosrokhavar,	
1995).	These	 facts	would	appear	to	 lead	to	two	conclusions.	Firstly,	 the	
headscarf	is	imbued	with	values	which	the	majority	in	France	today	find	
indefensible:	the	wearing	of	a	headscarf	by	a	secular	woman	for	religious	
reasons	 is	 seen	as	nothing	but	 the	 legacy	of	an	oppressive	past.	The	
second	conclusion	 is	 that	 for	 the	non-Muslim	majority,	 the	 traditional	
image	of	 the	Judaeo-Christian	headscarf	has	come	to	be	projected	onto	
the	Muslim	woman’s	hijab.	This	 is	quite	 frankly	a	 form	of	orientalism	;	
however,	such	projection	goes	 further	than	the	cultural	 level,	 its	 traces	
can	even	be	seen	in	the	government’s	policies	on	religious	administration.	
For	example,	 in	response	to	 the	problems	 in	the	metropolitan	suburbs,	
the	French	Government	 attempted	 to	 engage	 in	dialogue	by	giving	
representation	to	moderate	muslims	through	organization	 from	the	top	
down,	but	 it	has	often	been	pointed	out	 that	 in	doing	 this,	 the	 image	
of	 the	old	relationship	between	the	Catholic	hierarchy	and	the	secular	
authorities	 is	being	projected	onto	 the	 idea	of	giving	representation	to	
‘Islam	in	France’	as	the	partner	in	dialogue	(the	clerical	hierarchy	as	in	
Catholicism	does	not	traditionally	exist	 in	Islam)x.	On the other hand, in 
media discourse, presentation of the headscarf issue emphasizes images 




the Muslim world, as well as images from the perspective of ‘modern’ 
feminism in the sense outlined above.	On	this	point,	Florence	Rochefort	
describes	 this	 sort	 of	 amplified	 signification	 through	her	 analysis	 of	
the	media’s	handling	of	 the	 first	headscarf	 incident	 in	autumn	1989xi.	
Rochefort	writes,	«The	disturbance	caused	by	this	controversy	[…]	was	
stirred	up	even	more	by	 the	 treatment	of	 the	 incident	on	 the	screen.	
The	war	of	diction—the	‘chador	of	discord’	was	opposed	by	the	moderate	
expressions	 ‘veil’,	 ‘hijab’,	 the	more	reserved	 ‘headscarf’	 and	 the	 irony-
laden	 ‘fabric’	 [tissu]—went	together	with	the	war	of	 images.	As	well	as	
the	photographs	of	 the	young	girls	 themselves,	 the	 image	used	almost	
systematically	 to	depict	 this	 incident	was	 the	photograph	of	women	
walking	at	 the	 front	of	a	demonstration	by	fundamentalists	on	October	
22nd,	 like	a	vengeful	mass	dressed	 in	 long	headscarves	and	chadors.	
[…]	the	young	women	dressed	in	headscarves	were	seen	at	that	time	as	
a	pure	embodiment	of	 the	 threat	of	 Islamists	of	 the	 Iranian	revolution	
















subject	of	sociological	 research	 for	over	 thirty	years.	This	dysfunction	
is	 thus	 not	 an	 isolated	phenomena	but	 is	 located	 in	 the	 context	 of	
dysfunction	 in	 social	 cohesion	at	a	more	global	 level.	The	wearing	of	
headscarves	also	occupies	an	ambiguous	position	in	this	context.	Certainly	
it	 is	 often	 interpreted	 as	 a	 sign	 of	 socio-economic	 problems	 being	





characterizations	surrounding	the	wearing	of	 the	headscarf,	 it	 remains	
a	 fact	 that	 a	minority	 of	Muslim	 schoolgirls	 seek	 the	 right	 to	wear	
the	headscarf.	Their	arguments	cannot	be	comprehensively	examined	
here,	but	there	are	two	points	 in	particular	the	author	wishes	to	make.	
Firstly, in order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to consider the unique 









prohibition	of	wearing	headscarves	 in	 the	public	sphere	 (1924),	mixed-




of	women’s	right	 to	vote	and	stand	 for	office	 (1934).	A	point	 forcefully	
made	by	the	sociologist	Nilufer	Göle	 is	 that	under	Turkey’s	republican,	
secular	system	there	are	in	fact	still	“educated	[women]	from	the	lower	
and	middle	 classes”	 calling	 for	 the	 right	 to	wear	 the	headscarf.	Göle	
states	 that,	 “paradoxically,	 these	headscarf-wearing	 female	 students,	
who	owe	 their	 social	 position	 and	newly	acquired	 social	 recognition	
to	having	had	 access	 to	 secular	 education,	 are	 further	 empowering	
themselves	by	gaining	knowledge	of	 Islam	and	seeking	political	rights”	










part	of	 the	 individual’s	body,	simultaneously	 invokes	assumptions	about	
the	 individual’s	 social	 status	 (Muslim,	 female,	Arab,	etc.).	 	Feminists	 in	
opposing	camps	are	equally	 cautious	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 symbolic	
aspects	of	the	headscarf’s	visibility.	For	example,	Iranian-born	Chahdortt	
Djavann,	a	writer	critical	of	 Islam’s	oppressive	character,	also	criticizes	
headscarf-wearing	women—what	 she	 calls	 ‘seamstress’—on	grounds	
of	 the	paradoxical	 inversion	of	 the	headscarf’s	visual	 function.	Djavann	
writes,	 “the	wearing	 of	 the	headscarf	 in	France	 is	 not	 a	means	 for	





of	exhibitionism	or	provocation.	The	 female	 transforms	herself	 into	an	
objet,	and	thereby	shows	herself	off;	more	precisely,	she	is	the	women	as	
sexual	object”	 (Djavann,	2003).	The	problem	of	 the	headscarf’s	visibility	
thus	 intersects	with	the	problem	of	 the	objectification	of	 the	body.	Yet	
this	 sort	 of	 language	also	 invites	 the	 counter-question	who	 (or	more	
precisely	what	 type	of	woman	–	whether	 they	wear	 the	headscarf	or	
not	–	and	what	type	of	man)	can	possibly	escape	the	logic	of	this	form	of	
objectification	of	 the	body	 (and	moreover	 the	 logic	of	commodification)	









people	may	 think	 it’s	wearing	 a	headscarf	 that	 ‘inferiorizes’	 us,	 but	
that’s	not	 the	only	thing”	 (Gathié,	1999).	While	 this	answer	might	seem	
perverse,	 it	also	shows	that	 the	calculation	 is	not	simple	 -	 it involves a 
careful weighing up of a two-fold inequality	(the	inequality	between	male	
and	 female,	 and	between	 the	 ‘immigrant’	population	and	 the	 ‘original	
French’	population)		and the advantages brought about by taking a position 

















of	 those	other	people	who	wish	to	undress	us.	 Interestingly,	 these	two	
obsessions	are	 two	 forms	 [depicting	a	 symmetry]	of	 the	denial	 of	 the	
female	as	if	reflected	in	a	mirror.	On	one	side,	the	arousal	of	desire	by	the	
female	is	always	desired,	while	on	the	other	side	it	is	forbidden.	However,	
in	both	cases,	 the	reference	point	 that	must	be	considered	relative	 to	
the	woman’s	own	body	 is	male	desire.	What	the	headscarf	makes	clear	
is	 that	 the	woman’s	body	 is	not	 the	body	of	oneself	but	 is	 in	 fact	 the	









Conclusion: views of the ‘headscarf issue’ from abroad
For	an	academic	scholar	observing	a	society	 from	abroad,	 there	are	at	
least	two	potential	 traps.	The	first	trap	 is	one	peculiar	to	Area Studies,	
namely	 that	being	 in	 the	position	of	a	 foreign	observer,	 the	scholar	 is	
prone	to	assimilate	the	history	of	the	whole	country	as	a	single	narrative	
viewed	 from	her	 own	perspective.	 In	 the	 first	half	 of	 this	 essay	 for	
example,	an	particular	interest	in	the	story	of	the	development	of	laïcité	
in	France	has	perhaps	led	us	to	underestimate	determining	factors	other	
than	 the	conflict	between	 the	Republic	and	 the	Catholic	Church.	This	
attitude	carries	 the	risk	of	 ‘fundamentalist	 laïcité’,	 of	blindly	enforcing	
the	 ideals	of	 laïcité	 in	a	multicultural	society	 like	France	today	 (it	 is	 to	
say	 that	 this	 risk	 is	not	 limited	 to	 foreign	scholars	 (Bancel,	Blanchard	
&	Vergès,	2003;	Weil	&	Dufois,	2005)).	The	other	trap	 is	peculiar	to	the	
Cultural Studies	 scholar.	For	scholars	 trained	 in	 the	methodologies	of	
cultural	studies—not	uncommon	 in	universities	 in	 the	English-speaking	
world—it	 is,	 if	 anything,	 easy	 to	 recognize,	within	 the	discourse	 of	
fundamentalist	 laïcité	used	by	some	French,	a	 form	of	historical	denial	
in	 the	post-colonial	 period.	And	 it	 is	 only	 a	 small	 step	 from	here	 to	
the	weaving	of	narratives	concerning	 the	 latent	political	 and	cultural	
power	 of	 the	 diaspora	 brought	 about	 by	 colonialization.	However,	
schematic	diagrams	 from	 the	 cultural	 studies	handbook,	unless	 they	
take	 into	account	the	peculiarities	of	 the	French	context	 (the	historical	
development	 of	 laïcité	 in	 the	public	 sphere,	 etc.),	will	 impose	 some	
simplistic	 explanation	on	 the	 issue.	The	concerns	of	 this	 essay	were	
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ii	 Gallicanism	can	be	defined	as	 ‘the	principle	of	 independence	of	 the	Church	of	
France’,	and	is	often	understood	as	the	ideal	that	the	right	of	investiture	should	
rest	with	 the	monarch.	The	Conseil	 d’État	 report	 refers	 to	 ‘administrative	
Gallicanism’	in	the	restored	monarchy.
iii	 This	 holds	 true	despite	 the	 ongoing	dispute	 between	 religious	 groups	 and	








v		 “To	make	assertions	 about	principles	 applied	 to	 contexts	differing	 from	 the	
particular	situation	in	which	a	law	was	enacted	is	to	raise	these	principles	from	
the	particular	to	the	general,	from	fact	to	ideal.	With	regard	to	laïcité,	one	of	the	
most	 frequent,	most	 subtle	and	yet	most	 forceful	attacks	 is	 the	attack	which	
denies	 the	values	held	by	 laïcité	 in	 the	 form	of	 these	principles,	 and	which	




they	would	not	apply	such	relativization	to	Jesus’	 injunction	to	 love	 (Sermon	on	
the	Mount).	 Incidentally,	 if	 the	value	 in	 this	 injunction	 to	 love	does	not	derive	
only	from	the	particular	historical	situation	in	which	it	was	born,	but	can	be	seen	
as	deriving	 from	the	meaning	 inherent	 in	 the	 injunction,	 then	 irrespective	of	
what	choices	should	be	made	in	relation	to	faith,	the	same	acceptance	should	also	
be	given	to	the	principle	 that	unites	consideration	 for	ones	 inner	 freedom	with	




of	 separation	 through	 laïcité,	 and	many	 thinkers	 from	various	 periods	 and	
considerably	different	standpoints,	 including	those	with	a	religious	perspective	
in	the	true	meaning	of	the	word,	have	indicated	the	necessity	of	this	separation.	
This law is not an agreement	 [that	regards	State	and	Church	as	equal	parties	 -	
Onaka],	it is a unilateral act of liberation based on the sovereignty of the people, and 
by this law the sovereignty of the people acknowledges the justness of that agreement 
in its claim to universality,”	 (Pena-Ruiz,	2004,	pp.35-36;	quoter’s	emphasis).	 	One	













vii		 With	 regard	 to	 the	 application	of	 the	 1905	 law,	 aside	 from	several	 overseas	
départements	 such	as	French	Guiana	being	excluded	 from	the	 law’s	coverage,	
départements	 in	 the	Alsace-Moselle	region	have	remained	under	 the	concordat	
system	(combined	with	German	law	with	regard	to	association)	even	after	being	
restored	to	France	after	WWI.	
viii		According	 to	Hanifa	Chérifi,	 Inspector	General	 of	 the	Education	Ministry,	 in	
the	academic	year	2004-5,	 44	pupils	were	expelled	 form	wearing	 the	Muslim	
headscarf,	while	3	were	expelled	for	wearing	the	Sikh	turban	(Chérifi,	2005).	












xi		 The	 first	headscarf	 incident	 in	 this	 controversy	was	 the	 expulsion	 of	 three	
Muslim	schoolgirls	from	Gabriel	Havez	School,	Creil,	Oise.	
xii		 See	Amselle,	2001,	on	the	 lack	of	application	of	 laïcité	 in	Algeria	under	French	
colonial	rule,	and	on	the	colonialist	nature	of	multiculturalism.
xiii	See	Bellil,	2003.
The	Muslim	Schoolgirl's	Headscarf	in	the	Public	Space	of	Modern	France:
Hosei University Repository
